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Abstract:  
We study the effect of learning on optimal growth. We first derive the Euler equation in a 
general learning environment without experimentation. We then consider the case of iso-
elastic utility and linear production, for general distributions of the random shocks and 
beliefs (i.e., no conjugate priors) and for any horizon. We characterize the unique 
optimal policy function for this learning model. We show how learning alters the 
maximization problem of the social planner. We also compare the learning model with 
the deterministic and stochastic models. 
This work builds on the work on learning and growth in a Brock-Mirman environment 
initiated by Koulovatianos, Mirman, and Santugini (2009) (KMS) for the Mirman-Zilcha 
model (with log utility and Cobb-Douglas production). While the Mirman-Zilcha model 
provides some insights about the effect of learning on growth, it also hides many 
important features of learning that the model in this paper takes account of. In other 
words, compared to the Mirman-Zilcha model, we show that the case of iso-elastic utility 
and linear production yields a more profound effect of learning on dynamic programming 
and thus optimal behavior. 
 
Keywords: Brock-Mirman environment, Dynamic programming, Learning, Optimal 
growth 
JEL Classification: D8, D9, E2 
 
1 Introduction
Uncertainty is ubiquitous to virtually all economic problems beginning with
growth and real business cycles in macroeconomics and continuing with in-
dustrial organization and consumer behavior in microeconomics. Indeed,
economic agents make optimal decisions without complete knowledge of the
environment in which they live. This is particularly relevant to dynamic
maximization problems in which a myriad of future variables is unobserved
by the decision makers. To analyze optimal behavior under uncertainty,
random shocks are included in the objective functions and the constraints.1
While the agents have no knowledge of the realized shocks, they know their
distributions and thus use this knowledge to form expectations over the sum
of present and discounted future payoffs subject to constraints.
Uncertainty is particularly relevant in optimal growth. Although agents
have a certain control over the evolution of capital such as infrastructures,
roads, telecommunications, energy, and common-pool natural resources, the
dynamics of capital remains highly uncertain. In the stochastic growth mod-
els initially studied in Brock and Mirman (1972) and Mirman and Zilcha
(1975), the social planner makes consumption and saving decisions taking
account of uncertainty by forming expectations. However, economic agents
have the ability to do more than just react to uncertainty. In many cases,
they can also alter the uncertainty they face through learning. That is, agents
learn about the structure of the economy in order to reduce the uncertainty
they face. For instance, suppose that in addition to not observing future
shocks, the agents ignore the true distributions generating these shocks. In
that case, observing past shocks provides information about these unknown
distributions. Hence, the agents not only make decisions of consumption and
saving, but at the same time they engage in econometric activities, gather-
ing and analyzing data in order to learn about unknown variables, and, thus,
reducing the uncertainty they face. In general, decision making and learning
are nonseparable and influence each other.2
1Random shocks can be embedded in positive models as well. See Mirman (1970) for
an early analysis of uncertainty (i.e., random production function) in the Solow model.
2There is a two-way interaction between decision making and learning. On the one
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Unlike the literature on stochastic optimal growth models, there is lit-
tle work on learning optimal growth models.3 One exception concerns the
study of capital accumulation when the agents have the ability to experi-
ment. However, these models consider at most a three-period horizon or
rely heavily on the use of conjugate priors, especially the normal distribu-
tion.4 Recently, Koulovatianos, Mirman, and Santugini (2009) (KMS) pro-
vides closed-form solutions for the social planner’s optimal policy function
in the Mirman-Zilcha class of models when the agents learn about the pro-
duction function.5 In the learning growth model studied in KMS, there is
no experimentation. Indeed, the full problem (with experimentation) has
yet to be solved or studied in optimal growth with infinite horizon. Hence,
understanding the problem of learning takes several steps. KMS makes the
assumption that the signal is seen so experimentation is not relevant. Yet,
the learning activity changes future payoffs.6 Optimal behavior is charac-
terized for general distributions of the random shock and beliefs (i.e., no
use of conjugate priors). The class of Mirman-Zilcha models with log utility
and Cobb-Douglas production functions offers a preliminary insight of the
effect of learning on optimal growth. Although learning is shown to have a
profound effect on the social planner’s optimal policy function (there is no
equivalence in the function form between the stochastic case and the learn-
ing case), it turns out that the log case combined with the Cobb-Douglas
hand, decision making may have an effect on learning, which is referred as experimentation.
On the other hand, the presence of learning adds risk which affects future payoffs and thus
behavior.
3There is however a large literature that has focused on learning in dynamic program-
ming but abstracting from the evolution of capital. This was largely studied in the context
of models of experimentation in which the only link between periods is beliefs. See Prescott
(1972), Grossman et al. (1977), Easley and Kiefer (1988, 1989), Kiefer and Nyarko (1989),
Balvers and Cosimano (1990), Aghion et al. (1991), Fusselman and Mirman (1993), Mir-
man et al. (1993), Trefler (1993), Creane (1994), Fishman and Gandal (1994), Keller and
Rady (1999), and Wieland (2000).
4See Bertocchi and Spagat (1998), Datta et al. (2002), El-Gamal and Sundaram (1993),
Huffman and Kiefer (1994), and Beck and Wieland (2002).
5For non-optimal models, e.g., bounded rationality, there is a literature on adaptive
learning. See Evans and Honkapohja (2001).
6Even with iid shocks in production, a learning environment implies that the agents
face Markov shocks through the updating of the beliefs. See Hopenhayn and Prescott
(1992) and Mirman et al. (2008) for stochastic growth models with Markov processes.
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function removes some of the effects of learning. The reason is that in the
Mirman-Zilcha class of models, part of the effect of learning is found in the
constant term of the value function, which has no effect on optimal behav-
ior. In this paper, we extend further the analysis of the effect of learning
(without experimentation) on another more general class of growth models
with iso-elastic utility and linear production functions. The social planner
faces multiplicative uncertainty in production and does not know the true
distribution of the production shock.
To understand the effect of learning, we do not conjecture and verify
the value function as previously done in KMS. Rather, we solve for opti-
mal behavior recursively, which sheds light on how learning alters the social
planner’s maximization problem. We show that there is a unique solution
for optimal behavior for every finite horizon. We also show that the limit
exists, yielding a unique solution for the infinite horizon. To clarify the effect
of learning, we also consider two benchmark cases, the deterministic case in
which all parameters are known and the stochastic case in which production
depends on a random shock with a known distribution. We then compare
the benchmark models with the learning model. In particular, with unbiased
beliefs about the mean of the production shock, learning increases consump-
tion.
Finally, we compare the effect of learning between the Mirman-Zilcha
class of models studied in KMS and the class of models studied in this pa-
per. In general, the effect of learning is two-fold. First, there is a direct
effect due to the anticipation of the planner about the stochastic effect of
today’s production shock on tomorrow’s stock as well as the stochastic ef-
fect of today’s production shock on tomorrow’s expectations about the next
period production shock. Second, there is an indirect effect of learning that
the agent anticipates (stochastically) the effect of observing the production
shock on posterior beliefs through future optimal decisions, i.e., what the
planner alters behavior upon observing the shock and updating beliefs. In
the Mirman-Zilcha class of models, only the first direct effect influences op-
timal behavior whereas both direct and indirect effects matter in the class of
models with iso-elastic utility and linear production functions.
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The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we introduce learning
in a general Brock-Mirman environment and derive the Euler equation cor-
responding to learning growth. Section 3 provides the optimal policy func-
tions for the specific class of models corresponding to the deterministic and
stochastic (benchmark) models. Section 4 provides the analysis for the learn-
ing growth models. Finally, in Section 5, we compare the effect of learning
on the maximization problem between our model (with iso-elastic utility and
linear production) and the Mirman-Zilcha model (with log utility and Cobb-
Douglas production).
2 Model
In this section, we present the Brock-Mirman environment under a learning
environment. We also consider two benchmark models, the deterministic and
stochastic environments. For each environment, we derive and compare the
Euler equations. In the subsequent sections, we study the effect of learning
on dynamic programming in the case of an iso-elastic utility and a linear
production.
2.1 Preliminaries
Consider a Brock-Mirman environment in which, in period t = 0, 1, ..., a
social planner divides output yt between consumption ct and investment kt =
yt − ct. Investment kt is then used for the production of the output in the
subsequent period, i.e.,
yt+1 = f(yt − ct, rt), (1)
where f(kt, rt) is the production function with the usual neoclassical prop-
erties7 and rt is a realization of the random production shock r˜t with p.d.f
φ(rt|θ
∗), rt ∈ H ⊂ R. The p.d.f. depends on a parameter θ
∗ ∈ Θ ⊂ RN , N ∈
N. The distribution of rt is parametric and fully characterized by the vector
7Namely, f(·, rt) is an increasing concave differentiable function with f(0, rt) = 0 for
all rt. The Inada conditions are also assumed, f1(0, rt) =∞ and f1(∞, rt) = 0 for all rt.
Finally, f(kt, ·) is an increasing differentiable function for all kt.
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θ∗.
In order to study the effect of learning, we consider the deterministic and
the stochastic benchmark environments. Before proceeding with the analysis,
we describe the three environments. Regardless of the environment faced by
the planner, his objective is to maximize the expected sum of discounted
utilities where the discount factor is δ ∈ (0, 1) and the utility function is
u(ct), u
′ > 0, u′′ < 0 with u′(0) = ∞. To simplify notation, the t-subscript
for indexing time is removed and the hat sign is used to indicate the value of a
variable in the subsequent period, i.e., y is output today and yˆ = f(y−c, r) is
output tomorrow when today’s production shock is r. To distinguish among
different horizons of the dynamic program, we use the index τ = 0, 1, . . . ,∞.
2.2 Benchmark Models
In the deterministic environment, today’s production shock r is known to
have constant value r¯. For τ = 1, 2, . . ., the τ -period-horizon value function
in a deterministic (D) environment is
V Dτ (y; r¯) = max
c∈[0,y]
{
u(c) + δV Dτ−1(f(y − c, r¯); r¯)
}
. (2)
The maximum is obtained at a unique point c = ρDτ (y; r¯) since the maximand
is strictly concave. Moreover, ρDτ (y; r¯) ∈ (0, y) since u
′(0) =∞. For τ = ∞,
the optimal policy cD(y) ≡ ρD∞(y; r¯) satisfies the Euler equation
u′(cD(y)) = δf1(y − c
D(y), r¯) · u′(cD(yˆD)), (3)
where yˆD ≡ f(y − cD(y), r¯).
In the stochastic environment, the planner faces uncertainty about
the future production shocks while knowing the true distribution of r˜, i.e., θ∗
is known. For τ = 1, 2, ..., the τ -period-horizon value function in a stochastic
(S) environment is
V Sτ (y; θ
∗) = max
c∈[0,y]
{
u(c) + δ
∫
r∈H
V Sτ−1(f(y − c, r); θ
∗)φ(r|θ∗)dr
}
. (4)
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The maximum is obtained at a unique point c = ρSτ (y; θ
∗) since the maximand
is strictly concave. Moreover, ρSτ (y; θ
∗) ∈ (0, y) since u′(0) = ∞. From Mir-
man and Zilcha (1975), for τ = ∞, the optimal policy cS(y) ≡ ρS∞(y; θ
∗)
satisfies the Euler equation
u′(cS(y)) = δ
∫
r∈H
f1(y − c
S(y), r) · u′(cS(yˆS(r)))φ(r|θ∗)dr, (5)
where yˆS(r) ≡ f(y − cS(y), r).
2.3 Learning Model
Having presented the benchmark models, we now described our dynamic
model with learning. In the learning environment, the planner faces un-
certainty about future production shocks as well as uncertainty about the
true distribution of production shocks, i.e., the parameter θ∗ is unknown to
the planner. While the planner does not know θ∗, observing past produc-
tion shocks provides information about the true distribution, which is used
to update beliefs via Bayesian methods. Given today’s prior beliefs about
θ∗ expressed as a prior p.d.f. ξ on Θ and the observation r,8 tomorrow’s
posterior beliefs are
ξˆ(θ|r) =
φ(r|θ)ξ(θ)∫
x∈Θ
φ(r|x)ξ(x)dx
, (6)
θ ∈ Θ, by Bayes’ Theorem. Since there is a one-to-one relationship between
output and the shock (i.e., f2 > 0), observing the production shock is equiv-
alent to observing output. In other words, there is no active learning (or
experimentation). Under active learning (or experimentation), the planner’s
decision has an effect on the information, i.e., posterior beliefs depend on the
decision.9 While we consider passive learning in which the planner’s decision
has no effect on the information used to learn about the unknown parameter,
the presence of passive learning in dynamic models increases risk in future
8That is, given prior beliefs ξ, the probability that θ∗ ∈ S is
∫
θ∈S
ξ(θ)dθ for any S ⊂ Θ.
9See Mirman, Samuelson, and Urbano (1993) for a model with active learning.
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payoffs, which alters behavior.
The planner makes consumption decision, while learning about θ∗. That
is, endowed with initial stock and beliefs, consumption is chosen. The pro-
duction shock r is then realized and the output, in the subsequent period,
is determined from (1). Information is gleaned from observing r, which,
from (6), affects beliefs about θ∗. For τ = 1, 2, . . ., the τ -period-horizon
value function in a learning (L) environment is
V Lτ (y; ξ) = max
c∈[0,y]
{
u(c) + δ
∫
r∈H
V Lτ−1(f(y − c, r); ξˆ(·|r))
[∫
θ∈Θ
φ(r|θ)ξ(θ)dθ
]
dr
}
,
(7)
where
∫
θ∈Θ
φ(r|θ)ξ(θ)dθ is the expected p.d.f. of the production shock given
prior beliefs.
In addition to anticipating the effect of the consumption decision on fu-
ture output, the planner anticipates learning. In a dynamic and learning
context, rational expectations imply that the information contained in the
future production shock is anticipated. The anticipation of learning is inte-
grated into (7) by anticipating the updated beliefs from ξ to ξˆ(·|r) using (6).
While learning is passive, the evolution of beliefs must be taken into account
in dynamic programming. Bayesian dynamics complicates the maximization
problem because the planner makes consumption and investment decisions,
anticipating updating beliefs every period. That is, the continuation value
function V Lτ−1(f(y − c, r), ξˆ(·|r)) in (7) encompasses beliefs that have been
updated many times, and in the infinite-horizon case infinitely many times.
The maximum is obtained at a unique point c = ρLτ (y; ξ) since the max-
imand is strictly concave. Moreover, there cannot be any corner solutions,
i.e., ρLτ (y; ξ) ∈ (0, y) since u
′(0) = ∞. Thus, for the infinite horizon, all
programs from any initial point never exhaust the stock and are infinite. Fo-
cusing on the infinite horizon, Lemma 2.1 states that the value function is
differentiable and is equal to the marginal utility evaluated at the maximizer,
i.e., the envelope theorem. This result is then used to derive the Euler equa-
tion under learning in Proposition 2.2. The proof follows closely the proof
of Lemma 1 in Mirman and Zilcha (1975) because learning is passive and a
change in today’s consumption with no corresponding change in investment
9
has no effect on the type of information that the agent either anticipates
acquiring or actually acquires from observing future production shocks.
Lemma 2.1. ∂V L∞(y; ξ)/∂y exists for all y and ξ and
∂V L∞(y; ξ)
∂y
= u′(ρL∞(y; ξ)). (8)
Proposition 2.2 states the Euler equation in the learning environment.
Proposition 2.2. For all y and ξ, the optimal policy ρL∞(y; ξ) satisfies the
Euler equation
u′(ρL∞(y; ξ)) = δ
∫
r∈H
f1(y−ρ
L
∞(y; ξ), r)·u
′(ρL∞(yˆ
L(r); ξˆ(·|r)))
[∫
θ∈Θ
φ(r|θ)ξ(θ)dθ
]
dr,
(9)
where yˆL(r) ≡ f(y − ρL∞(y; ξ), r).
Proof. The first-order condition corresponding to (7) is
u′(c) = δ
∫
r∈H
f1(y − c, r)
∂V Lτ (yˆ, ξˆ(·|r))
∂yˆ
[∫
θ∈Θ
φ(r|θ)ξ(θ)dθ
]
dr (10)
evaluated at c = ρL∞(y; ξ). Since (8) holds for all y and ξ,
∂V L∞(yˆ,ξˆ(·|r))
∂yˆ
=
u′(ρL∞(y; ξ)) yielding (9).
Observe that the changes between the Euler equations for the benchmark
models (defined by (3) and (5)) and the Euler equation under learning (de-
fined by (9)) are subtle but important. In particular, if we compare the
stochastic and learning cases, learning does more than changing the distri-
bution of the production shock from the true distribution used in (5) to the
believed distribution used in (9). It also alters the marginal utility evaluated
at tomorrow’s consumption through the randomness of future beliefs, i.e., the
term u′(ρL∞(yˆ
L(r); ξˆ(·|r))) in (9). Indeed, anticipating learning through the
posterior beliefs embedded in the Euler equation implies that the dynamics
in output and beliefs are entwined through the production shock as shown
in (9).
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In order to study the effect of learning on optimal growth, we make fur-
ther assumptions on the utility and production functions but retain general
distributions of the production shock and beliefs. In particular, we make
no restriction on the evolution of beliefs and we do not prevent the prior
and posterior p.d.f.’s ξ and ξˆ(·|r) from belonging to different families. In
the remainder of the paper, we study the class of optimal stochastic growth
models with iso-elasticity utility function and linear production function un-
der multiplicative uncertainty. It turns out that for this class of models an
implicit solution can be characterized and is valid for a wide range of priors,
even those that are outside of families of distributions that are closed under
sampling.
Assumption 2.3. The utility function is iso-elastic: u(c) = cα, α ∈ (0, 1).
Assumption 2.4. The production function is linear: f(k, r) = rk, r > 0.
Given Assumptions 2.3 and 2.4, the Euler equation can be used to derive
the infinite-horizon optimal policy function for any environment. Beginning
with the benchmark models, from (3) and (5), optimal policy functions are
linear in y, i.e., ρD∞(y; r¯) = ω
D
∞(r¯)y and ρ
S
∞(y; θ
∗) = ωS∞(θ
∗)y, where
ωD∞(r¯) = 1− δ
1
1−α r¯
α
1−α , (11)
ωS∞(θ
∗) = 1− δ
1
1−α
(∫
r∈H
rα
[∫
θ∈Θ
φ(r|θ)ξ(θ)dθ
]
dr
) 1
1−α
. (12)
For the learning case, plugging the linear solution ρL∞(y; ξ) = ω
L
∞(ξ)y into (9)
yields an implicit solution for ωL∞(ξ):
ωL∞(ξ)
α−1
(1− ωL∞(ξ))
α−1
= δ
∫
r∈H
rαωL∞(ξˆ(·|r))
α−1
[∫
θ∈Θ
φ(r|θ)ξ(θ)dθ
]
dr. (13)
However, the Euler equation method hides all the intricacies of learning and
prevents a thorough analysis of the effect of learning on dynamic program-
ming. In particular, it is not clear whether (13) is consistent with the limit of
the finite programs. To study the effect of learning on behavior, we proceed
as follows. Section 3 presents optimal behavior for the benchmark mod-
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els. The step-by-step analysis is necessary to understand how learning alters
dynamic programming, which is discussed in Section 4.
3 Benchmark Models
3.1 Deterministic Model
In a deterministic environment, given Assumptions 2.3 and 2.4, (2) is rewrit-
ten as
V Dτ (y; r¯) = max
c∈(0,y)
{
cα + δV Dτ−1(r¯(y − c); r¯)
}
. (14)
Using (14) and the fact that V D0 (y; r¯) = y
α,10 the one-period-horizon value
function is
V D1 (y; r¯) = max
c∈(0,y)
{
cα + δV D0 (r¯(y − c); r¯)
}
, (15)
= max
c∈(0,y)
{cα + δr¯α(y − c)α} , (16)
so that the first-order condition cα−1 − δr¯α(y − c)α−1 = 0 yields
ρD1 (y; r¯) =
y
1 + δ
1
1−α r¯
α
1−α
. (17)
Plugging (17) back into (16) yields
V D1 (y; r¯) =
(
1 + δ
1
1−α r¯
α
1−α
)1−α
yα. (18)
Given that, from (18), the one-period-horizon value function is linear in
yα, we now consider a τ -period horizon where the continuation value function
is of the form V Dτ−1(y; r¯) = κ
D
τ−1y
α with constant parameter κDτ−1 > 0. For
10When there is no horizon (i.e., τ = 0), it is optimal to consume the entire stock
regardless of the environment faced by the planner.
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τ = 2, 3, . . ., the τ -period-horizon value function is
V Dτ (y; r¯) = max
c∈(0,y)
{
cα + δV Dτ−1(r¯(y − c); r¯)
}
, (19)
= max
c∈(0,y)
{
cα + δκDτ−1r¯
α(y − c)α
}
, (20)
so that the first-order condition cα−1 − δκDτ−1r¯
α(y − c)α−1 = 0 yields
ρDτ (y; r¯) =
y
1 +
(
κDτ−1
) 1
1−α δ
1
1−α r¯
α
1−α
. (21)
Plugging (21) back into (20) yields
V Dτ (y; r¯) =
(
1 +
(
κDτ−1
) 1
1−α δ
1
1−α r¯
α
1−α
)1−α
yα, (22)
≡ κDτ y
α, (23)
so that
κDτ =
(
1 +
(
κDτ−1
) 1
1−α δ
1
1−α r¯
α
1−α
)1−α
(24)
with, from (18), initial condition
κD1 =
(
1 + δ
1
1−α r¯
α
1−α
)1−α
. (25)
Proposition 3.1 provides the optimal policy function for any finite horizon.
Proposition 3.1. In a deterministic environment, for τ = 0, 1, ...,
ρDτ (y; r¯) =
y∑τ
t=0 δ
τ
1−α r¯
ατ
1−α
. (26)
Proof. Solving (24) and imposing the initial condition (25) yields
κDτ =
(∑τ
t=0
δ
τ
1−α r¯
ατ
1−α
)1−α
. (27)
Plugging (27) back into (21) yields (26).
Proposition 3.2 provides the optimal policy function for an infinite hori-
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zon.
Proposition 3.2. Suppose that r¯
α
1−α ∈ (0, 1). Then, from (26), limτ→∞ ρ
D
τ (y; r¯) ≡
ρD∞(y; r¯) exists and
ρD∞(y; r¯) = (1− δ
1
1−α r¯
α
1−α )y. (28)
3.2 Stochastic Model
In a stochastic environment, given Assumptions 2.3 and 2.4, (4) is rewritten
as
V Sτ (y; θ
∗) = max
c∈(0,y)
{
cα + δ
∫
r∈H
V Sτ−1(r(y − c); θ
∗)φ(r|θ∗)dr
}
, (29)
Using (29) and the fact that V S0 (y; θ
∗) = yα, the one-period-horizon value
function is
V S1 (y; θ
∗) = max
c∈(0,y)
{
cα + δ
∫
r∈H
V S0 (r(y − c); θ
∗)φ(r|θ∗)dr
}
, (30)
= max
c∈(0,y)
{
cα + δ
(∫
r∈H
rαφ(r|θ∗)dr
)
(y − c)α
}
(31)
so that the first-order condition cα−1 − δ
(∫
r∈H
rαφ(r|θ∗)dr
)
(y − c)α−1 = 0
yields
ρS1 (y; θ
∗) =
y
1 + δ
1
1−α
(∫
r∈H
rαφ(r|θ∗)dr
) 1
1−α
. (32)
Plugging (32) back into (31) yields
V S1 (y; θ
∗) =
(
1 + δ
1
1−α
(∫
r∈H
rαφ(r|θ∗)dr
) 1
1−α
)1−α
yα. (33)
Given that, from (33), the one-period-horizon value function is linear in
yα, we now consider a τ -period horizon where the continuation value function
is of the form V Sτ−1(y; θ
∗) = κSτ−1y
α with constant parameter κSτ−1 > 0. For
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τ = 2, 3, . . ., the τ -period-horizon value function is
V Sτ (y; θ
∗) = max
c∈(0,y)
{
cα + δ
∫
r∈H
V Sτ−1(r(y − c); θ
∗)φ(r|θ∗)dr
}
, (34)
= max
c∈(0,y)
{
cα + δκSτ−1
(∫
r∈H
rαφ(r|θ∗)dr
)
(y − c)α
}
, (35)
so that the first-order condition cα−1−δκSτ−1
(∫
r∈H
rαφ(r|θ∗)dr
)
(y−c)α−1 = 0
yields
ρSτ (y; θ
∗) =
y
1 +
(
κSτ−1
) 1
1−α δ
1
1−α
(∫
r∈H
rαφ(r|θ∗)dr
) 1
1−α
. (36)
Plugging (36) back into (35) yields
V Sτ (y; θ
∗) =
(
1 +
(
κSτ−1
) 1
1−α δ
1
1−α
(∫
r∈H
rαφ(r|θ∗)dr
) 1
1−α
)1−α
yα, (37)
≡ κSτ y
α, (38)
so that
κSτ =
(
1 +
(
κSτ−1
) 1
1−α δ
1
1−α
(∫
r∈H
rαφ(r|θ∗)dr
) 1
1−α
)1−α
, (39)
with, from (33), initial condition
κS1 =
(
1 + δ
1
1−α
(∫
r∈H
rαφ(r|θ∗)dr
) 1
1−α
)1−α
. (40)
Proposition 3.3 provides the optimal policy function for any finite horizon.
Proposition 3.3. Suppose that
∫
r∈H
rαφ(r|θ∗)dr < ∞. In a stochastic en-
vironment, for τ = 0, 1, ...,
ρSτ (y; θ
∗) =
y∑τ
t=0 δ
τ
1−α
(∫
r∈H
rαφ(r|θ∗)dr
) τ
1−α
. (41)
15
Proof. Solving (39) and imposing the initial condition (40) yields
κSτ =
(∑τ
t=0
δ
τ
1−α
(∫
r∈H
rαφ(r|θ∗)dr
) τ
1−α
)1−α
(42)
Plugging (42) back into (36) yields (41).
Proposition 3.4 provides the optimal policy function for an infinite hori-
zon.
Proposition 3.4. Suppose that
∫
r∈H
rαφ(r|θ∗)dr ∈ (0, 1). Then, from (41),
limτ→∞ ρ
S
τ (y; θ
∗) ≡ ρS∞(y; θ
∗) exists and
ρS∞(y; θ
∗) =
(
1− δ
1
1−α
(∫
r∈H
rαφ(r|θ∗)dr
) 1
1−α
)
y. (43)
Before proceeding with the learning environment, we compare optimal
policy functions between deterministic and stochastic environments. First,
from (21) and (36) (or (28) and (43)), there is some sort of certainty equiva-
lence between deterministic and stochastic environments. That is, replacing
r¯α by
∫
r∈H
rαφ(r|θ∗)dr in (21) yields (36). Second, while adding uncertainty
does not alter the functional form of the policy, risk does have an effect on the
optimal amount consumed. To see this, suppose that r¯ =
∫
r∈H
rφ(r|θ∗)dr.
Then, from (21) and (36) and using the fact that α ∈ (0, 1), uncertainty
makes future payoffs riskier, which increases present consumption, i.e., for
τ = 1, 2, . . . ,∞, ρDτ (y; r¯) < ρ
S
τ (y; θ
∗)|∫
r∈H
rφ(r|θ∗)dr=r¯.
4 Learning Model
Having fully characterized the optimal behavior under deterministic and
stochastic environments, we turn to the learning model. By considering finite
horizons, we show explicitly how learning alters the maximization problem.
In a learning environment, given Assumptions 2.3 and 2.4, (7) is rewritten
16
as
V Lτ (y; ξ) = max
c∈(0,y)
{
cα + δ
∫
r∈H
V Lτ−1(r(y − c); ξˆ(·|r))
[∫
θ∈Θ
φ(r|θ)ξ(θ)dθ
]
dr
}
,
(44)
Using (44) and the fact that V L0 (y; ξ) = y
α, the one-period-horizon value
function is the one-period-horizon value function is
V L1 (y; ξ) = max
c∈(0,y)
{
cα + δ
∫
r∈H
V L0 (r(y − c); ξˆ(·|r))
[∫
θ∈Θ
φ(r|θ)ξ(θ)dθ
]
dr
}
,
(45)
= max
c∈(0,y)
{
cα + δ
(∫
r∈H
rα
[∫
θ∈Θ
φ(r|θ)ξ(θ)dθ
]
dr
)
(y − c)α
}
,
(46)
so that the first-order condition cα−1 = δ
(∫
r∈H
rα
[∫
θ∈Θ
φ(r|θ)ξ(θ)dθ
]
dr
)
(y−
c)α−1 yields
ρL1 (y; ξ) =
y
1 + δ
1
1−α
(∫
r∈H
rα
[∫
θ∈Θ
φ(r|θ)ξ(θ)dθ
]
dr
) 1
1−α
(47)
Plugging (47) back into (46) yields
V L1 (y; ξ) =
(
1 + δ
1
1−α
(∫
r∈H
rα
[∫
θ∈Θ
φ(r|θ)ξ(θ)dθ
]
dr
) 1
1−α
)1−α
yα. (48)
For a one-period horizon, the presence of learning does not alter the func-
tional form of the policy function. Indeed, replacing r¯ in (17) or
∫
r∈H
rαφ(r|θ∗)dr
in (32) by ∫
r∈H
rα
[∫
θ∈Θ
φ(r|θ)ξ(θ)dθ
]
dr (49)
yields (47). However, for higher horizon, learning considerably alters the
maximization problem of the planner. To see this, using (48), the two-
17
period-horizon value function is
V L2 (y; ξ)
= max
c∈(0,y)
{
cα + δ
∫
r∈H
V L1 (r(y − c); ξˆ(·|r))
[∫
θ∈Θ
φ(r|θ)ξ(θ)dθ
]
dr
}
, (50)
= max
c∈(0,y)
{
cα
+ δ
∫
r∈H

(1 + δ 11−α (∫
r′∈H
r′α
[∫
θ′∈Θ
φ(r′|θ′)ξˆ(θ′|r)dθ′
]
dr′
) 1
1−α
)1−α
rα(y − c)α


·
[∫
θ∈Θ
φ(r|θ)ξ(θ)dθ
]
dr,
}
(51)
where ξˆ(θ|r) is defined by (6).
Expression (51) has multiple integrals for the production shock. The outer
integral with dummy r reflects the uncertainty faced by the planner today
(i.e., in period 1) about today’s production shock which is revealed tomorrow.
The uncertainty emanating from today’s yet-to-be-realized production shock
has an effect on the stock tomorrow (through the term rα(y − c)α) and on
posterior beliefs (through the term ξˆ(θ|r)). The effect through posterior
beliefs complicates the maximization problem because updating beliefs has
an effect on the inner integral with dummy r′ that refers to the expectation
that the planner takes tomorrow (i.e., in period 2 or second-to-last period)
for tomorrow’s production shock affecting stochastically production in after
tomorrow (i.e., in period 3 or last period). To see this from another point of
view, (51) can be simplified to
V L2 (y; ξ) = max
c∈(0,y)
{
cα + δ
∫
r∈H
(
ωL1 (ξˆ(·|r))
)α−1
rα(y − c)α
[∫
θ∈Θ
φ(r|θ)ξ(θ)dθ
]
dr
}
,
(52)
where, from (47),
ωL1 (ξˆ(·|r)) =
(
1 + δ
1
1−α
(∫
r∈H
rα
[∫
θ∈Θ
φ(r|θ)ξ(θ)dθ
]
dr
) 1
1−α
)−1
(53)
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is the optimal consumption rate for the one-period horizon. From (52), to-
day’s shock affects tomorrow’s payoff via the stock and via tomorrow’s opti-
mal behavior in a one-period horizon.
The first-order condition corresponding to (52) is
cα−1− δ
∫
r∈H
(
ωL1 (ξˆ(·|r))
)α−1
rα(y− c)α−1
[∫
θ∈Θ
φ(r|θ)ξ(θ)dθ
]
dr = 0, (54)
yielding the two-period-horizon policy
ρL2 (y; ξ) =
y
1 + δ
1
1−α
(∫
r∈H
(
ωL1 (ξˆ(·|r))
)α−1
rα
[∫
θ∈Θ
φ(r|θ)ξ(θ)dθ
]
dr
) 1
1−α
.
(55)
Note that (55), retains the linearity in y, and, thus, the two-period-horizon
value function also retains the linearity in yα.
Given that, from (48), the one-period-horizon value function is linear in
yα, we now consider a τ -period horizon where the continuation value function
is of the form V Lτ−1(y; ξ) =
(
ωLτ−1(ξ)
)α−1
yα, where, unlike the deterministic
and stochastic environments, ωLτ−1(ξ) ∈ (0, 1) is not a constant, and depends
on beliefs that evolve over time. For τ = 2, 3, . . ., the τ -period-horizon value
function is
V Lτ (y; ξ) = max
c∈(0,y)
{
cα + δ
∫
r∈H
V Lτ−1(r(y − c), ξˆ(·|r))
[∫
θ∈Θ
φ(r|θ)ξ(θ)dθ
]
dr
}
,
(56)
= max
c∈(0,y)
{
cα + δ
∫
r∈H
(
ωLτ−1(ξˆ(·|r))
)α−1
rα(y − c)α
[∫
θ∈Θ
φ(r|θ)ξ(θ)dθ
]
dr
}
.
(57)
The first-order condition
cα−1 = δ(y − c)α−1
∫
r∈H
(
ωLτ−1(ξˆ(·|r))
)α−1
rα
[∫
θ∈Θ
φ(r|θ)ξ(θ)dθ
]
dr (58)
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yields ρLτ (y; ξ) = ω
L
τ (ξ)y where ω
L
τ (ξ) is implicitly defined by
ωLτ (ξ)
α−1 = δ(1−ωLτ (ξ))
α−1
∫
r∈H
(
ωLτ−1(ξˆ(·|r))
)α−1
rα
[∫
θ∈Θ
φ(r|θ)ξ(θ)dθ
]
dr.
(59)
Plugging ρLτ (y; ξ) = ω
L
τ (ξ)y back into (57) yields
V Lτ (y; ξ) =
(
ωLτ (ξ)
α + δ(1− ωLτ (ξ))
α
∫
r∈H
(
ωLτ−1(ξˆ(·|r))
)α−1
rα
·
[∫
θ∈Θ
φ(r|θ)ξ(θ)dθ
]
dr
)
yα, (60)
≡
(
ωLτ (ξ)
)α−1
yα, (61)
so that the optimal consumption rate for τ -period horizon is consistent with
the functional form of the continuation value function and implicitly charac-
terized by
ωLτ (ξ)
α−1 = ωLτ (ξ)
α + δ(1− ωLτ (ξ))
α
∫
r∈H
(
ωLτ−1(ξˆ(·|r))
)α−1
rα
·
[∫
θ∈Θ
φ(r|θ)ξ(θ)dθ
]
dr, (62)
ωLτ (ξ) =
1
1 + δ
1
1−α
(∫
r∈H
(
ωLτ−1(ξˆ(·|r))
)α−1
rα
[∫
θ∈Θ
φ(r|θ)ξ(θ)dθ
]
dr
) 1
1−α
,
(63)
with, from (47), initial condition
ωL1 (ξ) =
(
1 + δ
1
1−α
(∫
r∈H
rα
[∫
θ∈Θ
φ(r|θ)ξ(θ)dθ
]
dr
) 1
1−α
)−1
. (64)
Proposition 4.1 provides the optimal policy function for any finite horizon.
Proposition 4.1. Suppose that
∫
r∈H
rα
[∫
θ∈Θ
φ(r|θ)ξ(θ)dθ
]
dr < ∞. In a
learning environment, for τ = 0, 1, . . ., ρLτ (y; ξ) = ω
L
τ (ξ)y, where ω
L
τ (ξ) is
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recursively defined by
ωLτ (ξ)
α−1 =
(
1 + δ
1
1−α
(∫
r∈H
(
ωLτ−1(ξˆ(·|r))
)α−1
rα
[∫
θ∈Θ
φ(r|θ)ξ(θ)dθ
]
dr
) 1
1−α
)1−α
,
(65)
with initial condition
ωL1 (ξ) =
(
1 + δ
1
1−α
(∫
r∈H
rα
[∫
θ∈Θ
φ(r|θ)ξ(θ)dθ
]
dr
) 1
1−α
)−1
. (66)
Proof. Rearranging (63) yields (65).
Proposition 4.2 provides the optimal policy function for an infinite hori-
zon.
Proposition 4.2. Suppose that
∫
r∈H
rα
[∫
θ∈Θ
φ(r|θ)ξ(θ)dθ
]
dr ∈ (0, 1). Then,
from (65), limτ→∞ ρ
L
τ (y; ξ) ≡ ρ
L
∞(y; ξ) = ω
L
∞(ξ)y exists and ω
L
∞(ξ) ∈ (0, 1) is
implicitly defined by
ωL∞(ξ)
α−1 =
(
1 + δ
1
1−α
(∫
r∈H
(
ωL∞(ξˆ(·|r))
)α−1
rα
[∫
θ∈Θ
φ(r|θ)ξ(θ)dθ
]
dr
) 1
1−α
)1−α
.
(67)
Proof. Let κτ (ξ) ≡ ω
L
τ (ξ)
α−1 so that (65) is rewritten as
κτ (ξ) =
(
1 + δ
1
1−α
(∫
r∈H
κτ−1(ξˆ(·|r))r
α
[∫
θ∈Θ
φ(r|θ)ξ(θ)dθ
]
dr
) 1
1−α
)1−α
.
(68)
1. Monotonicity of κτ (ξ). From (47) and (55), we know that
κ0(ξ) = 1 < κ1(ξ) =
(
1 + δ
1
1−α
(∫
r∈H
rα
[∫
θ∈Θ
φ(r|θ)ξ(θ)dθ
]
dr
) 1
1−α
)1−α
.
(69)
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Suppose next that κτ (ξ) > κτ−1(ξ). Then,
κτ+1(ξ) =
(
1 + δ
1
1−α
(∫
r∈H
κτ (ξˆ(·|r))r
α
[∫
θ∈Θ
φ(r|θ)ξ(θ)dθ
]
dr
) 1
1−α
)1−α
(70)
>
(
1 + δ
1
1−α
(∫
r∈H
κτ−1(ξˆ(·|r))r
α
[∫
θ∈Θ
φ(r|θ)ξ(θ)dθ
]
dr
) 1
1−α
)1−α
(71)
= κτ (ξ). (72)
2. Boundedness of κτ (ξ). Let
M =

 1
1− δ
1
1−α
(∫
r∈H
rα
[∫
θ∈Θ
φ(r|θ)ξ(θ)dθ
]
dr
) 1
1−α

1−α > 1 (73)
since
∫
r∈H
rα
[∫
θ∈Θ
φ(r|θ)ξ(θ)dθ
]
dr ∈ (0, 1). Hence, κ0(ξ) = 1 < M .
Suppose next that κτ (ξ) < M . Then,
κτ+1(ξ) =
(
1 + δ
1
1−α
(∫
r∈H
κτ (ξˆ(·|r))r
α
[∫
θ∈Θ
φ(r|θ)ξ(θ)dθ
]
dr
) 1
1−α
)1−α
(74)
<
(
1 + δ
1
1−αM
1
1−α
(∫
r∈H
rα
[∫
θ∈Θ
φ(r|θ)ξ(θ)dθ
]
dr
) 1
1−α
)1−α
,
(75)
=M. (76)
where the last equality comes from (73).
3. Since limτ→∞ κτ (ξ) exists, so does limτ→∞ ω
L
τ (ξ). Since κτ (ξ) ≡ ω
L
τ (ξ)
1−α,
taking the limits on both sides of (68) yields (67).
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Having studied the effect of learning on the planner’s maximization prob-
lem and characterized optimal behavior in a learning model, we now discuss
the effect of learning on optimal behavior. Specifically, we compare optimal
behavior under stochastic and learning environments (in the context of an
iso-elastic utility and linear production).
Proposition 4.3. Suppose that beliefs about the random production shock
are unbiased, i.e.,∫
r∈H
r
[∫
θ∈Θ
φ(r|θ)ξ(θ)dθ
]
dr =
∫
r∈H
rφ(r|θ∗)dr. (77)
Then, learning increases present consumption, i.e., ρL∞(y; ξ) > ρ
S
∞(y; θ
∗).
Proof. First, from (77) and the fact that α ∈ (0, 1), it follows that
∫
r∈H
rα
[∫
θ∈Θ
φ(r|θ)ξ(θ)dθ
]
dr <
∫
r∈H
rαφ(r|θ∗)dr,
1− δ
1
1−α
(∫
r∈H
rα
[∫
θ∈Θ
φ(r|θ)ξ(θ)dθ
]
dr
) 1
1−α
> 1− δ
1
1−α
(∫
r∈H
rαφ(r|θ∗)dr
) 1
1−α
.
(78)
Second, from Proposition 4.2, ρL∞(y; ξ) = ω
L
∞(ξ)y such that from the proof
of Proposition 4.2,
ωL∞(ξ) =
1
κL∞(ξ)
1
1−α
(79)
where from (74), (75), and (76), κL∞(ξ) < M , M defined by (73). Since
κL∞(ξ) ≡ ω
L
∞(ξ)
α−1, it follows that
ωL∞(ξ) >
1
M
1
1−α
. (80)
Plugging (73) into (80) yields
ωL∞(ξ) > 1− δ
1
1−α
(∫
r∈H
rα
[∫
θ∈Θ
φ(r|θ)ξ(θ)dθ
]
dr
) 1
1−α
. (81)
Combining inequalities (78) and (81) with (43) implies that learning in-
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creases consumption, i.e.,
ρL∞(y; ξ) = ω
L
∞(ξ)y (82)
>
(
1− δ
1
1−α
(∫
r∈H
rα
[∫
θ∈Θ
φ(r|θ)ξ(θ)dθ
]
dr
) 1
1−α
)
y, (83)
>
(
1− δ
1
1−α
(∫
r∈H
rαφ(r|θ∗)dr
) 1
1−α
)
y (84)
= ρS∞(y; θ
∗). (85)
5 Discussion: Learning in Mirman-Zilcha
We now compare the effect of learning on the maximization problem between
our model (with iso-elastic utility and linear production) and the Mirman-
Zilcha model (with log utility and Cobb-Douglas production). While the
planner’s policy function in the Mirman-Zilcha model is derived in KMS,
there is no explanation about how learning alters the maximization problem
in that context. Here, we show that the combination of a log utility and
Cobb-Douglas production removes some (but not all) of the effect of learning.
To consider the Mirman-Zilcha model, suppose that u(c) = ln c and yˆ =
(y − c)r, r ∈ (0, 1). Then, the τ -period-horizon value function is
WLτ (y; ξ) = max
c∈(0,y)
{
ln c+ δ
∫ 1
0
WLτ−1((y − c)
r; ξˆ(·|r))
[∫
θ∈Θ
φ(r|θ)ξ(θ)dθ
]
dr
}
,
(86)
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with WL0 (y; ξ) = ln y. The one-period-horizon value function is
WL1 (y; ξ) = max
c∈(0,y)
{
ln c+ δ
∫ 1
0
W 0((y − c)r, ξˆ(·|r))
[∫
θ∈Θ
φ(r|θ)ξ(θ)dθ
]
dr
}
,
(87)
= max
c∈(0,y)
{
ln c+ δ
∫ 1
0
r ln(y − c)
[∫
θ∈Θ
φ(r|θ)ξ(θ)dθ
]
dr
}
, (88)
= max
c∈(0,y)
{
ln c+ δ ln(y − c)
∫ 1
0
r
[∫
θ∈Θ
φ(r|θ)ξ(θ)dθ
]
dr
}
, (89)
= max
c∈(0,y)
{
ln c+ δ ln(y − c)
∫
θ∈Θ
[∫ 1
0
rφ(r|θ)dr
]
ξ(θ)dθ
}
, (90)
= max
c∈(0,y)
{
ln c+ δ
(∫
θ∈Θ
µ(θ)ξ(θ)dθ
)
ln(y − c)
}
, (91)
where µ(θ) ≡
∫ 1
0
rφ(r|θ)dr. The first-order condition 1
c
−
δ
∫
θ∈Θ
µ(θ)ξ(θ)dθ
y−c
= 0
yields
ρL1 (y; ξ) =
y
1 + δ
(∫
θ∈Θ
µ(θ)ξ(θ)dθ
) , (92)
≡ ωL1 (ξ)y. (93)
Plugging (93) into (91) yields
WL1 (y; ξ) = ln ρ
L
1 (y; ξ) + δ
(∫
θ∈Θ
µ(θ)ξ(θ)dθ
)
ln(y − ρL1 (y; ξ)), (94)
= lnωL1 (ξ)y + δ
(∫
θ∈Θ
µ(θ)ξ(θ)dθ
)
ln(y − ωL1 (ξ)y), (95)
=
(
1 + δ
∫
θ∈Θ
µ(θ)ξ(θ)dθ
)
ln y
+ lnωL1 (ξ) + δ
(∫
θ∈Θ
µ(θ)ξ(θ)dθ
)
ln(1− ωL1 (ξ)). (96)
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Using (96), the two-period-horizon value function is
W 2(y; ξ)
= max
c∈(0,y)
{
ln c + δ
∫ 1
0
W 1((y − c)r, ξˆ(·|r))
[∫
θ∈Θ
φ(r|θ)ξ(θ)dθ
]
dr
}
, (97)
= max
c∈(0,y)
{
ln c + δ
∫ 1
0
(
1 + δ
∫
θ′∈Θ
µ(θ′)ξˆ(θ′|r)dθ′
)
ln(y − c)r
[∫
θ′∈Θ
φ(r|θ)ξ(θ)dθ
]
dr
+δ
∫ 1
0
(
lnωL1 (ξˆ(·|r)) + δ
(∫
θ′∈Θ
µ(θ′)ξˆ(θ′|r)dθ′
)
ln(1− ωL1 (ξˆ(·|r)))
)
·
[∫
θ∈Θ
φ(r|θ)ξ(θ)dθ
]
dr
}
, (98)
= max
c∈(0,y)
{
ln c + δ
(∫ 1
0
(
1 + δ
∫
θ′∈Θ
µ(θ′)ξˆ(θ′|r)dθ′
)
r
[∫
θ∈Θ
φ(r|θ)ξ(θ)dθ
]
dr
)
ln(y − c)
+δ
∫ 1
0
(
lnωL1 (ξˆ(·|r)) + δ
(∫
θ′∈Θ
µ(θ′)ξˆ(θ′|r)dθ′
)
ln(1− ωL1 (ξˆ(·|r)))
)
·
[∫
θ∈Θ
φ(r|θ)ξ(θ)dθ
]
dr
}
, (99)
where ωL1 (ξˆ(·|r)) is the optimal consumption rate for a one-period horizon
evaluated at the posterior beliefs.
Consider expression (99) more closely:
WL2 (y; ξ)
= max
c∈(0,y)

ln c+ δ
(∫ 1
0
(
1 + δ
∫
θ′∈Θ
µ(θ′)ξˆ(θ′|r)dθ′
)
r ln(y − c)
[∫
θ∈Θ
φ(r|θ)ξ(θ)dθ
]
dr
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=A
+δ
∫ 1
0
(
lnωL1 (ξˆ(·|r)) + δ
(∫
θ′∈Θ
µ(θ′)ξˆ(θ′|r)dθ′
)
ln(1− ω1(ξˆ(·|r)))
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=B
·
[∫
θ∈Θ
φ(r|θ)ξ(θ)dθ
]
dr
}
, (100)
where the planner anticipates the effect of today’s production shock using
the expected p.d.f. of r˜ given prior beliefs, i.e.,
∫
θ∈Θ
φ(r|θ)ξ(θ)dθ. From
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(100), the effect of learning is two-fold. First, the term A refers to the
anticipation of the planner about the stochastic effect of today’s production
shock r on tomorrow’s stock (i.e., r ln(y− c)), as well as the stochastic effect
of today’s production shock on tomorrow’s expectations about the last period
production shock, i.e.,
∫
θ′∈Θ
µ(θ′)ξˆ(θ′|r)dθ′. In the Mirman-Zilcha model, the
term A can be further simplified to
A =
∫ 1
0
(
1 + δ
∫
θ′∈Θ
µ(θ′)
φ(r|θ′)ξ(θ′)∫
θ′′∈Θ
φ(r|θ′′)ξ(θ′′)dθ′′
dθ′
)
r ln(y − c)
[∫
θ∈Θ
φ(r|θ)ξ(θ)dθ
]
dr,
(101)
=
∫ 1
0
([∫
θ∈Θ
φ(r|θ)ξ(θ)dθ
]
+ δ
∫
θ′∈Θ
µ(θ′)φ(r|θ′)ξ(θ′)dθ′
)
r ln(y − c)dr,
(102)
=
([∫
θ∈Θ
(∫ 1
0
rφ(r|θ)dr
)
ξ(θ)dθ
]
+ δ
∫
θ′∈Θ
µ(θ′)
(∫ 1
0
φ(r|θ′)rdr
)
ξ(θ′)dθ′
)
ln(y − c),
(103)
=
([∫
θ∈Θ
µ(θ)ξ(θ)ddθ
]
+ δ
∫
θ′∈Θ
µ(θ′)2ξ(θ′)dθ′
)
ln(y − c), (104)
which implies that the effect of the posterior beliefs enters through integrals of
functions of of the conditional mean production shock, i.e., µ(θ), θ ∈ Θ. Note
that from (52), for the case of iso-elastic utility and linear production with
multiplicative uncertainty, it is impossible to obtain this type of conditional
certainty equivalence.
The term B reflects the planner’s (stochastic) anticipation of the effect
of observing the production shock on the future optimal decision once he
reaches a one-period horizon program through the optimal consumption rate
ωL1 (ξˆ(·|r)). This is the indirect effect of anticipation of learning on beliefs
through future optimal decisions, i.e., what the planner will do once he gets
to a one-period horizon program, observes r, and updates beliefs. From (100),
only the term A matters for optimization. In other words, optimal behavior
in shorter horizon or subsequent periods (embedded in the term B in (100))
do not matter. However, from (52), in the case of iso-elastic utility and linear
production, both the direct and the indirect effects remain. In particular,
27
posterior beliefs cannot be simplified and optimal behavior in the future
remains affected by learning.
28
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